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Abstract 
 
This paper presents work in progress within the MUNIN unmanned ship project. It will briefly discuss 
some points in a basic framework of design criteria for the Human-Machine Interface (HMI) of the 
Shore Control Centre where operators monitor, and have the ability to remotely control the 
unmanned vessels. The starting point will be the notion that unmanned ships might reduce human 
error. It also presents some example of simple interactive screens based on this framework. A 
prototype HMI for the Shore Control Centre will later this year be tested with users in a simulator 
based set up at Chalmers University of Technology. 
 
1. Introduction  
 
In March 2013 the executive vice president of the newly merged Det Norske Veritas and 
Germanischer Lloyd (DNV GL), Bjorn Haugland, wrote that unmanned ships was a potential game 
changer calling it “Unmanned vessels – the trump card”. He linked unmanned ships to potentials of 
lower operational costs, elimination of on-board crew cost, risk associated with human error and 
threats to crew safety: 
 
“Unmanned ships will revolutionize supply chain logistics and there will be no restriction on how 
much time a vessel can spend at sea, as there are no humans affected. Ships that do not carry time 
sensitive cargoes, such as perishable goods could, in theory, drift with sea currents, to move as energy 
efficiently as possible,” Haugland (2014). 
 
Unmanned ships will rely on automation and remote control and it is an interesting question if is 
possible to reduce accidents due to human error by automation. This paper will discuss some of the 
human factors issues concerning remote control of unmanned ships. First a brief introduction to the 
MUNIN unmanned ship project. 
 
1.1. Maritime unmanned navigation though intelligence in networks 
 
Maritime Unmanned Navigation though Intelligence in Networks (MUNIN), is a 3-year project in the 
European 7th framework program. The objective of the MUNIN project is to show the feasibility of 
unmanned, autonomous merchant ships. The ship will be under control of on-board crew approaching 
and leaving a harbour. The goal is that the ship will be autonomous and unmanned from pilot drop-off 
point to pilot pick-up point. However there might be maintenance teams or other personal on-board if 
necessary. The goal is also that the ship will be under autonomous control during the main part of the 
ocean voyage, remotely monitored from the SCC. Only in exceptional cases the shore control centre 
is expected to have to actually remote control the ship. 
 
The consortium consists of different industry or research partners who work with different parts of the 
concept: data architecture, autonomous navigation, autonomous engine control, advanced sensor 
systems, and legal implications. The Department of Shipping and Marine Technology at Chalmers 
University of Technology is responsible for the Shore Control Centre. 
 
In the Shore Control Centre a number of operators will monitor a number of unmanned vessels. We 
assume that one operator will be able monitor more than one vessel. How many is one of the points to 
be determined and much depends on the human-machine interfaces of the shore centre. An operator 
monitoring several ships will have to rely on automatic systems alerting him or her on irregularities of 
the operation. So the question is how much manual control we will actually have?  
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1.2. Autonomy and manual control 
 
At one end of the spectrum we have the wave-goodbye-and-forget-call-if-you-have-any-problems 
type of unmanned system. This kind of system will need a very reliable technology that can cope with 
all eventualities and call for help if needed. In such a system the ship would be assigned a destination 
port and a set arrival time and would then be left to solve the task by its own. Should there be any 
problems, the vessel would call and report its whereabouts and the nature of the problem (and what 
kind of help it required). 
 
At the other end of the spectrum we would have a ship system where each ship had a land based 
bridge team remotely controlling of the ship, just as had the bridge be lifted off the hull and placed on 
land and all the wiring prolonged by satellite links. The simplest (but also technically most difficult) 
would be to just copy the bridge ashore, and then stream all on-board information in real-time to that 
bridge: the vision through the wheelhouse windows via video cameras, the motions by a hydraulic 
system, etc. Done in this way the difference of control between unmanned and manned shipping 
would be small. There would still be an officer of the watch and a lookout/helmsman at the bridge of 
each ship. The technical challenge would be safe and secure transfer of very large data quantities, to 
cope with latency and to pay the satellite communication bill. (We have to some extent kept this idea 
is in the concept of the emergency “situation room.”) 
   
The concept investigated in the MUNIN project is one of autonomy and different levels of remote 
control if the autonomous system calls for help. We will rely on what we believe will be a robust 
autonomous system, once mature; meaning that we would expect human intervention to be an 
exceptional case in the trans-oceanic phase of the voyage.  The hypothesis being that one operator can 
safely monitor several ships, given the right kind of integrated human-machine interface. 
 
2. Human error  
 
From many studies we know that the number of accidents caused (in part) by “human error” is in the 
range of 70-95%, e.g. Sanquist (1992), Blanding (1987), Rothblum (n.d.). We all know from own 
experience that humans make mistakes. We forget, we misunderstand, our thoughts can go astray, and 
we might even fall asleep when we are not supposed to. This is all part of the human condition. And 
this is also what can causes accidents. And frequently does. This has been the case ever since man 
appeared. In a complex technical society, humans need help to cope. That is why we have 
continuously worked on technical systems supporting the human decision-making.  And successfully 
so, because accident rates do improve. 
  
To provide perspective: In the three years 1833-1835, on average 563 ships per year were reported 
wrecked or lost in United Kingdom alone, Crosbie (2006). Today the total number of tankers, bulk 
carriers, containerships and multipurpose ships in the world fleet has risen from about 12,000 in 1996 
to 30,000 in 2012. In the same time the number of ships totally lost per year (ships over 500 Gross 
Tons) declined from 225 in the year 1980, to 150 in 1996 and less than 60 in 2012 according to The 
International Union of Marine Insurance – and this worldwide. www.iumi.com/images/gillian/ 
Spring2013/IUMI%20Casualty%20and%20World%20Fleet%20Statistics%20Jan%202013.pdf. We 
can assume that much of this safety improvement has to do with improvements in technical 
reliability. But we can also assume that this to some extent has to do with improvements in 
automation systems supporting human monitoring and decision-making. Within commercial air 
industry, automation has improved safety, Billings (1997), Pritchett (2009), Wiener (1988). We can 
assume that the same is true for the shipping domain. 
 
2.1. Human error and automation 
 
Automation can, if designed carefully, remove a lot of mental workload for the human operator. Just 
compare position fixing on the open sea using sextant and sun tables in the days before the global 
navigation satellite systems. Still automation may invite new types of errors into the work 
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environment. Like automation bias. 
 
Mosier and Skitka (1996), p. 205, defined automation bias as “a heuristic replacement for vigilant 
information seeking and processing”. Meaning that if we know an automatic process is going to look 
for deviations, we will stop looking ourselves. Further we can look at the specific errors of omission 
and errors of commission, Skitka (2000), where omission errors are when the human operator fails to 
respond to system irregularities because the automatic system fails to detect or indicate them, and 
commission errors are the human operator incorrectly follows an automatic advice or directive 
because they do not check and verify against other sources of information. 
 
On the other hand, Norman (1990) already said that the problem was not one of automation, but one 
of inappropriate design of automation. He claimed that automatic systems instead of giving 
appropriate feedback tended to overuse alarms. He gave the example of the airplane captain that 
turned on the autopilot. When one of the engines then slowly lost power, the autopilot silently kept 
compensating for the unbalanced trust until it had nothing more to give and the plane rolled and went 
into a dive. He compared that to the captain that handed the controls over to the co-pilot, which, from 
the captain’s point of view, was the same thing as handing the controls over to the autopilot. The co-
pilot would then be expected to comment on the unbalanced power of the engine thrust long before it 
became a serious problem. He would say something like: “I seem to be correcting this thing more and 
more, I wonder what's happening?”, Norman (1990), p. 589, meaning that to keep the operator in the 
loop the automation needs to be more communicative, which is easier said than done. People form 
mental models of systems with which they interacts. The model is formed by the system image that 
the information displays of the system offers, Norman (1986). If the information displays are not 
communicative, the operator will not know what is going on; he will be out-of-the-loop. Norman 
(1990), p. 591, concludes: “To give the appropriate kind of feedback requires a higher level of 
sophistication in automation than currently exists.”  The question is: have we gotten any further since 
1990? 
 
From the maritime domain we hear the same thing: Automation is often used to help the bridge crews 
in complex tasks. But automation is risky as well. “It has been shown that operators will monitor less 
effectively when automation is installed, and even more so if the automation has been operating 
acceptably for a long period,” Lützhöft and Dekker (2002). Automation creates new human weak-
nesses and amplifies existing ones. The question is how to turn automatic systems into effective team 
players? Feedback from the automation is important and Lützhöft and Dekker suggest that 
representations of automation behavior will have to be: 
 
• Event-based: Representations need to highlight changes and events in a way that the current 
generation of state-oriented displays do not; 
• Future-oriented: in addition to historical, human operators in dynamic systems need support 
for anticipating changes and knowing what to expect and where to look next; 
• Pattern-based: operators must be able to quickly scan displays and pick up possible 
abnormalities without having to engage in difficult cognitive work (calculations, integrations, 
extrapolations of disparate pieces of data). By relying on pattern-based or form-based 
representations, automation has an enormous potential to convert arduous mental tasks into 
straightforward perceptual ones, Lützhöft and Dekker (2002), p. 95. 
 
3. Design framework 
 
Hutchins et al. (1986) talked about interfaces built as a model world, as a metaphor for the real world, 
or the real system to be controlled. By having the user acting directly on the model world which in 
turn is connected to the real worlds and show the responses of the real world, a sensation of direct 
manipulation, Schneiderman (1983), and direct perception, Flach and Vicente ( 1989), is achieved. 
The goal was to make the psychological distance as short as possible. A conceptual model for such an 
interface framework is depicted in Fig.1. 
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Fig.1: The three sets of behavioural-shaping constraints in a socio-technical system conceptualised as 
a tight fit between the three pieces of the puzzle; adapted from Bennet and Flach (2011) 
 
Reducing psychological distance means improving the match between the structure in the real world 
(the pattern and the regularities in ship operation) and the belief structures (mental models) of the 
remote operators. The limited space does not allow us to go any deeper into this but to say that this is 
the real challenge for the development of the human-machine interface of the shore control centre. In 
the following a number of example interface prototypes will be show. These prototypes will be 
further developed and finally tested in simulations within the MUNIN project. 
 
4. Design prototypes 
 
The prototypes show below is some examples of the interfaces that must convey situation awareness 
to the monitoring operator of the shore control centre. We are now only looking at the monitoring 
interfaces. The interfaces for control are something else. The monitoring screens must afford both 
overview and detailed resolution. The traditional interface will be the map view. 
 
4.1. The spatial overview 
 
On-board ships the Electronic Charts Display and Information System (ECDIS) is the modern 
standard equipment allowing the bridge officer easy access to spatial information. It is natural that an 
ECDIS-like system also is available for the remote operator, Fig.2.  
 
  
Fig.2: For spatial overview, traditional electronic chart is the natural interface. Left: zoomed out for 
overview; right: zoomed in for close vicinity of unmanned ship. Green box: planned position of ship 
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4.2. Temporal overview 
 
To allow the operator to overlook the whole voyage from a time perspective a temporal view showing 
different activities both in the ship time zone and in the shore centre time zone is offered. This view 
also affords event markers. These signify tasks the operator will have to attend to, e.g. send a mail to 
the pilot about next day’s arrival time, or report to the Vessel Traffic Centre, Fig.3.  
 
 
Fig.3: For temporal overview, a slot diagram is suggested, breaking down the voyage into days, and if 
zoomed in, into hours. The difference in time zones, showing day and night at the ships location and 
shifts in the shore control centre. Different coloured event markers (displayed both in the time view 
and on the chart) contain planned events, e.g. to email the pilot about arrival. 
 
The allocation and notification of tasks also allows for an aggregated notification service that 
responds if two tasks of two different ships with the same operator collides, e.g. the pilot is stepping 
off one ship at the same time as another pilot is climbing on-board another ship under the same 
operators control.   
 
4.3. Ship status indicator 
 
From an operational point of view it is important for many stakeholders to know if the unmanned 
vessel is in good condition and that all systems probably will survive a long unmanned voyage. 
Insurance companies will be particularly interested. 
 
Ship status can be aggregated from a very low, detailed level where every component and every pipe 
joint is assessed according to how many hours of expected life time remains until next maintenance 
session. Components, e.g. a fuel filter, can this way be aggregated to machine level, e.g. a generator, 
and then to higher system levels, e.g. the power system, and finally to the whole ship level. For very 
critical components where life-time assessments have proven difficult, redundancy has to be secured. 
Fig.4 shows an interface suggestion for such a ship status interface. It compares assessed remaining 
life-time until next service with remaining hours to destination and possible repair points. It also 
depicts redundancy levels, where yellow and red indicates lack of redundancy. The illustration shows 
the top, ship status, level. By clicking the status bar, lower system levels will be shown. Status 
assessments feeding information into the Status indicator display will be an important task not only 
during port visits, but probably also daily during the voyage by monitoring sensors of condition based 
maintenance. 
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Fig.4: The Ship status indicator screen allows the operator to make an at a glance assessment of the 
ships present status, remaining life time compared to time to destination or port of repair. The picture 
shows the top, ship level. By clicking the bar, the operator can open lower levels all the way down to 
the individual components of the whole ship. 
 
4.4. Trend lines 
 
The use of trend lines is an important tool to allow the operator to see what is going on, but also to 
compare with what went on in the past and then to possibly extrapolate it into the future. Fig.5 shows 
an online weather application as a simple illustration of how a trend line display might look like. 
 
 
Fig.5: Use of trend lines in a weather screen. The red vertical line represents present time, curves to 
the left of that line is made up of real measurements stored into an historical archive, and to the right 
of that line is a prognosis of how the weather is going to be some days into the future. Example from 
http://www.smhi.se/vadret/vadret-i-sverige/land?pp=http://www.smhi.se/produktportal-1.0//chart.do&geonameid=2692633 
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This type of trend line diagrams can be used for a lot of parameters of the unmanned ship, particularly 
in relation to technical installations and engines. 
 
4.5 Top level indications 
  
On the top level, a dashboard screen alerts the monitoring operator about the condition of the 
unmanned vessel. All information sent from the ship to the shore control is accessible under the nine 
tiles in the square. They are clustered in a standardised way into 1. Voyage, 2. Sailing, 3. 
Observations, 4. Safety and emergencies, 5. Security, 6. Cargo, stability and strength, 7. Technical, 8. 
Shore control centre, and 9. Administration. If any of the parameters under each tile breaches a 
yellow or red alert level, the tile will change colour and the Top flag in the middle of the large circle 
will also change colour, alerting the operator about that something on that vessel is calling for his/hers 
attention, Fig.6. 
 
Fig.6: This dashboard shows the top level indicators alerting the monitoring operator if something is 
wrong on the unmanned vessel. Under each of the nine tiles of the square all information sent from 
the ship to shore can be found. The circle contains the top indicator light (green, yellow or red) as 
well as the mode indicators, signifying in which mode the vessel presently is in (manual, autonomous, 
remote or fail-to-safe). 
 
There are more screens in the human-machine interface of the shore control centre which later will be 
presented in the deliverables of the MUNIN project. Particularly screens merging operational status 
of several ships into a simple interface for a single operator will be a challenge. 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
This paper has presented work by Chalmers University of Technology in the MUNIN unmanned ship 
project. This work concerns the display interface between the unmanned vessels on the high seas and 
the operator monitoring the ship’s progress and status from ashore. Challenges such as human error 
and automation have been discussed as well as a design framework for the interface development. 
Finally some example screens have been shown. The development now continues and a first iteration 
of user tests will be conducted later this year and finally presented in a project report that later can be 
found at the MUNIN site http://www.unmanned-ship.org/munin/  
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